Understanding The New Legislative Proposals On State Threat Activity

Insights from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism and State Threat Legislation’s May 2025 report, ‘State Threats and Terrorism’

In May 2025, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism and State Threat Legislation (IRTL), Jonathan Hall KC, published his latest report ‘State Threats and Terrorism’, proposing significant reforms to address evolving security challenges. Commissioned under the National Security Act 2023 (“NSA”), the report reviews the terrorist and state threat legislation, and any limitations in light of modern-day challenges.

Terrorism and State Threats in the UK

Terrorism by definition, encompasses acts which involve the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims. It is traditionally associated with acts of violence against civilians. Comparably, State Threats, refer to actions by foreign government backed entities that pose national security risks. It includes espionage, cyber-attacks, and even violence, and it is designed to influence the Government, intimidate the pubic, or advance a cause.

The last few years have shown more instances of individuals and groups willing to act on ‘for or on behalf of a foreign power’, with the Director General of MI5 warning those directly in the 2024 Annual Threat Update:

“Like the Russian services, Iranian state actors make extensive use of criminals as proxies – from international drug traffickers to low-level crooks. …
So to those tempted to carry out such tasks, I say this: If you take money from Iran, Russia or any other state to carry out illegal acts in the UK, you will bring the full weight of the national security apparatus down on you. It’s a choice you’ll regret.”

One example, shown recently in May in which six Bulgarians were convicted of spying for Russia. The case centred around a group of individuals (led by Orli Roussev) who collected intelligence in the UK, with the goal of gathering “information about individuals whose activities were of obvious interest to the Russian state, and about significant locations”. (R v Roussev and others, Central Criminal Court 2025). All six were convicted for conspiracy to spy, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, and received sentences ranging from 5-10 years.

Commenting on wider national security considerations in the case, HHJ Hilliard said at [56]:

“Making the UK the hardest operating environment for Russian covert action is critical to protecting the UK’s national security. … [It] is likely that the Russian Intelligence Services have increasingly been forced to rely on a broader range of methodologies, including the use of non-Russian nationals, to circumvent the steps taken to curtail their ability to operate covertly. … [The] fact that the defendants were in the UK operating under the direction of the Russian Intelligence Services was inherently prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It means that the Russian Intelligence Services have a foothold here. … [It] is extremely prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK for operations to be planned from the UK which target individuals here and abroad. Using the UK as a base from which to plan operations against individuals and locations abroad undermines this country’s standing with allies.”

Proposals on current legislation

Parliament over the last few years has responded to State Threats, passing new legislation. First, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, and then the National Security Act 2023. Both were enacted as a response to evolving UK national security threats, like the Salisbury poisonings in 2018. For example, the NSA introduces several strict liability offences (and in relation to threats), including:

• Section 1 (obtaining or disclosing protected information);
• Section 2 (obtaining or disclosing trade secrets);
• Section 3 (assisting a foreign intelligence service);
• Section 4 (entering etc. a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK);
• Section 12 (sabotage);
• Section 13 (foreign interference); and
• Section 17(1) (obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service).

This brings the NSA in line with similar offences under the Terrorism Act 2000. The NSA also makes acting for a foreign power an aggravating factor in sentencing, where a foreign power condition is met, possibly increasing a sentence (Sections 19-22 NSA).

Yet, ‘State Threats and Terrorism’ argues that current legislation does not go far enough to combat covert operations by foreign intelligence services domestically. In particular, an absence of equivalent proscription/classification power as contained in Part II of the 2000 Act to foreign state threats. Jonathan Hall KC proposes that the Secretary of State, “should have the power to issue a Statutory Alert and Liability Threat Notice (SALT Notice) against Foreign Intelligence Services”, which would act as a proscription regum for state entities. Akin to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 3(4)), the Secretary of State would only be able to issue a Notice if they believed the Foreign Intelligence Service to be concerned with UK national security interests.

As the report suggests (5.8), the absence of a SALT notice, would expose a genuine legislative gap should the UK Government face a situation in which it must respond to a ‘brazen act of hostility by a Foreign Intelligence Service on UK soil’, as currently the Government’s only available mechanism is via Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000, as was demonstrated in September 2023, with the proscription of the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation.

The report lists four main advantages with the new proscription regime:

1. The public and organisations susceptible to foreign state influence would be alert to state entities posing a national security risk;
2. By ‘naming and shaming’ state entities at an international level, the Government would be more accountable should the UK face serious harm as a Notice would be a public acknowledgement of potential threat posed;
3. A Notice would provide justification for counter-intelligence operations, and enforcement (including through new criminal offences for individuals who invite support for or display the insignia of the Foreign Intelligence Service in question); and
4. A SALT notice would provide a more reliable means of proscription for state backed entities by avoiding Terrorism Act 2000 proscription and avoid the risk of de-prescription if the entity is made a State in its own right.

The report highlights the need for the proscription regime for state entities to be focused on behaviour change where the non-state entity proscription regime focuses on denying the ability of proscribed organisations to exist.

However, the report does not go as far as recommending powers to combat State or State entities that sponsor terrorism (5.38), but Foreign Intelligence Services that do so would be susceptible to proscription where it seeks UK overreach. For example, in the case of Roussev, intelligence suggested the group were liaising with Russian Intelligence services in preparation for activity overseas.

Concluding thoughts

These latest proposals are another round of extending terrorism legislation to combat evolving security threats. It does not come without consequences. The definition of terrorism is incredibly broad and the powers created by terrorism legislation are open to abuse without proper scrutiny. The report acknowledges “the damage to personal freedoms and liberties, including freedom of association and expression, that any extension of national security powers can give rise to” (5.16). Criticism of the Secretary of State’s recent announcement that it would be proscribing ‘Palestine Action’ as a terrorist organisation and increasing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, highlights the need for decisions to be dispassionate, objective, and based on evidence, not political objectives. While the new legislative proposals outlined in the Report provide the Government more options to respond to a national security crisis, proscription or equivalent SALT Notice should not be used as a tool for political point scoring.

Offences under current terrorism legislation criminalise support for proscribed non-state entities. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for example it is an offence to wear, carry or display an item in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the wearer is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. In a world where news is spread and generated through social media, it is easy to fall foul of this legislation with ill thought-out posts or public reactions. At a time of great tension across the globe, creating new criminal offences for displaying support for state entities perceived as national security threats risks stifling political debate and creating greater division.

The proposed measures should be scrutinised to ensure that human rights are not weakened or disproportionately target communities. Moreover, though terrorism and state backed threats operate in similar spheres, countermeasures may illicit far different responses from the recipient.

If you are suspected of any terrorist offence, you should contact a solicitor as early as possible in your proceedings to ensure you receive the most accurate advice, and so that an effective strategy for your defence is in place from the very beginning. To speak to one of our criminal defence experts call 0330 822 3451 or request a callback online.